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BOSANQUET 
AND BRITISH POLITICAL THOUGHT* 
William Sweet 
Department of Philosophy 
St. Francis Xavier University, Nova Scotia 
RÉSUMÉ : La place de l'idéalisme britannique dans l'histoire de la pensée politique a fait l'objet 
de beaucoup de débats. D'aucuns ont soutenu qu'il constituait « un changement complet » par 
rapport à la tradition libérale de Mill et Bentham. Nous réexaminons ici quelques traits de la 
philosophie politique de Bosanquet, tentant de montrer que son caractère prétendument con-
servateur et « illibéral » est loin d'être évident. Il n'empêche — même si l'on trouve bon nom-
bre de valeurs libérales clés dans la pensée de Bosanquet — qu 'à plusieurs égards importants 
il rompt avec la tradition libérale antérieure en Grande-Bretagne. Ce qui nous permet de tirer 
quelques conclusions touchant la place de l'idéalisme dans l'histoire du libéralisme britanni-
que au dix-neuvième siècle. 
ABSTRACT : The place of British idealism in the history of political thought has been the subject of 
much debate. Some have maintained that it represented "a complete change" from the liberal 
tradition of Mill and Bentham. We reexamine here some features of Bosanquet's political phi-
losophy, arguing that evidence for its alleged "conservative" or "illiberal" character is far 
from conclusive. Still, while there are a number of key liberal values to be found in Bosan-
quet's thought, in several important respects he breaks with the earlier liberal tradition in 
Britain. This will allow us to draw some conclusions about the place of idealism in the history 
of 19th century British liberalism. 
T he place of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century idealists in the history of British political thought has been the subject of much disagreement. Some 
have seen them as taking positions that are incompatible, if not entirely incommensu-
rable, with the classical liberalism of Locke, Bentham and Mill. Others, such as 
L.T. Hobhouse1 and, more recently, John Morrow2 have argued that there is a signifi-
cant shift in political philosophy from the earlier (e.g., T.H. Green) to the later (e.g., 
Bernard Bosanquet and D.G. Ritchie) idealists and that it is only this "second genera-
* Previous versions of this paper have been presented at the conference on "Idealism in the Twentieth 
Century" sponsored by the British Society for the History of Philosophy (University of Hertfordshire, 
England, September, 1994), and at the Annual Meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, 
(Université du Québec à Montréal, June, 1995). I am grateful to the participants for their critical comments. 
1. See Leonard T. HOBHOUSE, The Metaphysical Theory of the State, London, George Allen & Unwin, 1918. 
2. See John MORROW, "Liberalism and British Idealist Political Philosophy : A Reassessment," History of 
Political Thought, 5 (1984), p. 91-108, at 93 and 109, and "Ancestors, Legacies and Traditions : British 
Idealism in the History of Political Thought," History of Political Thought, 6 (1985), p. 491-515, at 513-
514. 
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tion" that is fundamentally "illiberal". And there are yet others, such as A.D. Lindsay 
and Frederick Harris, who have maintained a quite contrary view — that "the social 
philosophy of British Neo-idealism exhibits a fundamental continuity with British 
liberal thought from the time of Locke."3 
I wish to return to this question by focusing on some aspects of what is, arguably, 
the most developed account of later idealist political thought — namely, that found in 
the work of Bosanquet. After briefly considering the main arguments for the three 
interpretations noted above, I suggest that there is not sufficient evidence to conclude 
that Bosanquet's views "signified a clear break with liberal political theory."4 Nev-
ertheless, I also suggest that, in several important respects, Bosanquet moves beyond 
the liberalism of such figures as Bentham and Mill. 
I 
According to one of the first extensive studies of the movement, Rudolf Metz's 
Die philosophischen Strômungen der Gegenwart in Groftbritannien,5 British idealism 
was not merely an alternative to the preceding utilitarian and empiricist traditions, but 
represented "a complete change."6 It was, Metz writes, "a complete recoil from the 
old ways, a turning of the philosophic rudder in an entirely new direction"7 from that 
of "John Stuart Mill, in whom all the currents of philosophical thought then really 
alive met."8 
This thesis was taken up, developed, and applied to idealist political thought by 
Klaus Dockhora, in his 1937 study, Die Staatsphilosophie des englischen Idealismus, 
ihre Lehre und Wirkung.9 Dockhorn argues here that there had long been a funda-
mental distinction between German and English theories of the state. Germanic 
political thought, he claims, had focused on "the realization of the moral worth of the 
state, the grandeur of the political, [and] the spiritual-organic way of being of the 
community" whereas English political theorists had traditionally concentrated on 
"living together as 'society,' as [a kind of] 'limited company,' as an aggregate and as 
3. Frederick Philip HARRIS, The Neo-Idealist Political Theory. Its Continuity with the British Tradition, New 
York, King's Crown Press, 1944 (Ph.D. thesis, Columbia University), p. 1. See also A.D. LINDSAY, 
"T.H. Green and the Idealists," in The Social and Political Ideas of Some Representative Thinkers of the 
Victorian Age, F.J.C. Hearnshaw, éd., London, Dawsons of Pall Mall, 1933, p. 150-164 [reprinted as an 
Introduction to the 4th, 5th and 6th editions of Green's Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation]. 
4. J. MORROW, "Liberalism and British Idealist Political Philosophy : A Reassessment," p. 107. 
5. Rudolf METZ, Die philosophischen Strômungen der Gegenwart in Grofibritannien, Leipzig, Felix Meiner 
Verlag, 1935 (translated as A Hundred Years of British Philosophy, tr. J.W. Harvey, T.E. Jessop and Henry 
Sturt ; J.H. Muirhead, éd., London, Allen and Unwin, 1938). 
6. See ibid., p. 237. 
7. Ibid. 
8. Ibid., p. 244-245. 
9. Klaus DOCKHORN, Die Staatsphilosophie des englischen Idealismus, ihre Lehre und Wirkung, Kôln/ 
Bochum-Langendreer, Heinrich Poppinghaus o. H.-G., 1937. Bosanquet is discussed on p. 61-116. 
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the association of interests of bare individuals."10 With the introduction of idealism 
into England, however, the earlier "individualistic tradition [was confronted with] a 
new organic theory that exalts the supremacy of the national state."11 Thus, in the 
latter part of the nineteenth century, "unheroic-bourgeois, liberal-individualist, un-
connected-secular, humanitarian-moral, 'civilizing'-positivistic, Enlightenment-
abstract" thought12 was replaced by a "Gemeinschaftsmetaphysik, that enables the 
individual to lose himself in a mystical union with the superior unity of the state."13 
On this view, then, British idealism — its political thought in particular — is an 
aberration in the history of Anglo-Saxon philosophy, and (so a number of commen-
tators have since argued) it is understandable why its influence seems to have lasted 
only as long as its major exponents were alive.14 
Although the Metz-Dockhorn interpretation reflects a still-influential reading of 
the place of idealism in the history of British political thought,15 there is a second, 
more modest, view. L.T. Hobhouse, J.A. Hobson and John Morrow,16 among others, 
have claimed that there was a shift from T.H. Green's idealism to the later formula-
tions by F.H. Bradley,17 D.G. Ritchie18 and, particularly, Bosanquet. It was only after 
Green, they argue, that British idealism explicitly adopted both the ontology and the 
political philosophy underlying the "Germanic" theory of the state. As the later 
idealists became more "Hegelian," however, they "retreated" from the liberal tradi-
tion.19 
10. Dockhorn opposes "die Erkenntnis der sittlichen Wurde des Staates, der Erhabenheit des Politischen, der 
geistig-organischen Wesenart der Gemeinschaft" of German "Staatslehre" with the English "Zusammen-
leben als 'society,' als 'limited company,' als Aggregat und Interessenverband bloBer Individuen zu be-
greifen" (ibid., p. VII). 
11. F.P. HARRIS, The Neo-Idealist Political Theory, p. 3. 
12. "Biirgerlich-unheroisch, individualistisch-liberal, bindungslos-sakularisch, moralistisch-humanitar, zivili-
satorisch-positivistisch, aufklârerisch-abstrakt" (K. DOCKHORN, Die Staatsphilosophie des englischen Ide-
alismus, ihre Lehre und Wirkung, p. VII). 
13. F.P. HARRIS, The Neo-Idealist Political Theory, p. 3. 
14. Bosanquet died in 1923, F.H. Bradley in 1924 and J.M.E. McTaggart in 1925. By the time that A.J. Ayer's 
Language, Truth and Logic was published, in 1936, idealism as a philosophical school in England was in 
sharp decline (See R. METZ, Die philosophischen Strômungen der Gegenwart in Grofibritannien, p. 258). 
15. This view, long accepted in the Anglo-Saxon world, can also be seen in Bertrand Russell's comments on 
idealism in his "Philosophy in the Twentieth Century" (in Sceptical Essays, London, Allen and Unwin, 
1962, p. 39). Similarly, J.L. Hemingway argues that idealism represents "a significant break in the liberal 
tradition, particularly in its introduction of German idealist elements into Anglo-Saxon liberalism" (See his 
The Emergence of an Ethical Liberalism. A Study in Idealist Liberalism from Thomas Hill Green to the 
Present, Ph.D. thesis in political science, University of Iowa, 1979). 
16. See the texts cited in notes 1 and 2, above, as well as J.A. HOBSON, The Crisis of Liberalism. New Issues of 
Democracy, London, 1909. 
17. Peter Nicholson has argued that Bradley was not conservative — or, at least, not as conservative as usually 
held. See Peter P. NICHOLSON, "Bradley as a Political Philosopher," in The Philosophy of F.H. Bradley, 
Anthony Manser and Guy Stock, éd., Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1984, p. 117-130 ; and his The Political 
Philosophy of the British Idealists. Selected Studies, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1990. 
18. See, for example, Ritchie's Natural Rights. A Criticism of Some Political and Ethical Conceptions, Lon-
don, Sonnenschein, 1895 ; and The Principles of State Interference. Four Essays on the Political Philoso-
phy of Mr Herbert Spencer, J.S. Mill and T.H. Green, London, 1891. 
19. J. MORROW, "Liberalism and British Idealist Political Philosophy : A Reassessment," p. 93. 
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This second reading of the later idealism focuses on Bosanquet's work and, spe-
cifically, on his accounts of the limits of state authority and the value of the individ-
ual. In his classic critique of idealist political thought, The Metaphysical Theory of 
the State, Hobhouse describes Bosanquet as the "most modern and most faithful 
exponent"20 of a Hegelian social philosophy wherein the state becomes "an end in 
itself."21 Bosanquet, Hobhouse maintained, follows Hegel in a defence of a "god-
state"22 which is above all criticism and, in such an environment, the individual 
human being ceases to have importance.23 (Morrow finds an illustration of this in 
what he sees as Bosanquet's openness to eugenics as a solution to the "problem" of 
"hereditary paupers"24.) Furthermore, this view asserts, such consequences are not 
accidental ; Bosanquet's political philosophy here is entirely consistent with the 
principles underlying his logic and his metaphysics. 
Both of the preceding accounts, then, hold that later idealist political thought — 
particularly, that of Bosanquet — is inconsistent with, if not antithetical to, British 
liberalism. For evidence of this, critics often cite Bosanquet's remarks on the nature 
of the state, the individual and the general will. For example, attention has frequently 
been drawn to Bosanquet's claims that the state is an "organism,"25 that its power is 
"absolute" (PTS 192 ; see PTS xm) and that there is little with which the state should 
not concern itself (PTS XII). Again, Bosanquet repeatedly insists that the human 
individual is not an ultimate principle of value26 and that the state can "force" indi-
viduals "to be free" (PTS 119). Finally, Bosanquet asserts that all organized social 
life must be based on a common good and on a general will that represents rationality 
par excellence, and that the state may do "with the moral approval of all what the 
explicit theory of scarcely one will morally justify"27. These remarks seem to be in 
clear conflict with the classical liberal accent on the inherent worth of the individual, 
the emphasis on diversity, pluralism and the right of individuals to determine and to 
20. L.T. HOBHOUSE, The Metaphysical Theory of the State, p. 18. I have argued against this view in "Was 
Bosanquet a Hegelian ?," Bulletin of the Hegel Society of Great Britain, 31 (1995), p. 39-60. 
21. L.T. HOBHOUSE, The Metaphysical Theory of the State, p. 73. 
22. Ibid., p. 6. 
23. Ibid., p. 68. Similarly, Herbert Marcuse alleges that Bosanquet's theory makes "the individual a victim of 
the hypostatized state universal, so characteristic of the later Fascist ideology" (Reason and Revelation. 
Hegel and the rise of Social Theory, 2nd éd., Boston, Beacon Press, 1960, p. 393). See also Hugh Joseph 
TALLON, The Concept of Self in British and American Idealism, Washington, Catholic University of 
America Press, 1939, p. 134 ; and J. MORROW, "Liberalism and British Idealist Political Philosophy : A 
Reassessment," p. 43. 
24. J. MORROW, "Liberalism and British Idealist Political Philosophy : A Reassessment," p. 103 ; J. MORROW, 
"Ancestors, Legacies and Traditions : British Idealism in the History of Political Thought," p. 511-512. 
25. The Philosophical Theory of the State, 1st éd., 1899 ; 4th éd., London, 1923, p. 23. All future references to 
this will be abbreviated as PTS and included in the text. 
26. See The Principle of Individuality and Value, London, Macmillan, 1912, p. 310 ; and "Do Finite Individu-
als possess a substantive or an adjectival mode of being ?," in Life and Finite Individuality (H. Wildon 
Carr, éd.), Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, supp. vol. 1, p. 75-102 ; 179-194, esp. p. 86-87. 
27. See "The Function of the State in Promoting the Unity of Mankind," Proceedings of the Aristotelian 
Society, n.s. XVII (1916-1917), p. 28-57 (reprinted in Social and International Ideals, London, 1917, 
p. 270-301), p. 274, citing F.H. BRADLEY, Ethical Studies, 2nd éd., Oxford, 1927, p. 184. All future refer-
ences to this will be abbreviated as FS and included in the text. 
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pursue their private conceptions of the good, and the necessity of imposing limits on 
state action. 
On these two accounts, then, if he was not explicitly statist and "absolutist,"28 
Bosanquet was, at the very least, "conservative."29 Given its opposition to individu-
alism, its accent on the authority of the state and its alleged tendency to find the ideal 
in the real, his work appears to defend, if not glorify, the status quo.30 Thus, Bosan-
quet has been described as "the 'ideal' expression of the Tory noblesse oblige of the 
Disraeli-Joseph Chamberlain-Unionist tradition"31 and, according to Bertrand Rus-
sell, "[rjeligion and conservatism look mainly to this school for defense against 
heresy and revolution."32 If the preceding arguments are correct, Bosanquet's politi-
cal thought clearly lies outside the late nineteenth century British liberal tradition. 
II 
Nevertheless, these interpretations are by no means universally accepted. It has 
been claimed, not only that nineteenth and early twentieth-century British idealism 
reflects a lengthy tradition of idealist thought in the Anglo-Saxon world33 but that its 
political philosophy is in continuity with earlier liberalism. According to A.D. Lind-
say, "so far as their political and social theories are concerned, the idealists 'are all of 
them, for all their Platonism and Hegelianism, in the succession of the utilitarians,'"34 
and, more recently, Gerald Gaus has argued that "J.S. Mill, Green, Bosanquet, 
L.T. Hobhouse, John Dewey and John Rawls share fundamental assumptions and 
constitute a single, coherent tradition of liberal thinking."35 
28. Andrew VINCENT, Raymond PLANT, Philosophy, Politics and Citizenship. The Life and Thought of the 
British Idealists, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1984, p. 121. 
29. See L.T. HOBHOUSE, The Metaphysical Theory of the State, p. 24 ; J. A. Hobson, The Crisis of Liberalism, 
p. 197, cited in F.P. HARRIS, The Neo-Idealist Political Theory, p. 109, n. 104 ; J.H. RANDALL, Jr. 
"Idealistic Social Philosophy and Bernard Bosanquet," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 
XXVI (1966), p. 473-502 (reprinted in The Career of Philosophy, 3 vols., vol. 3, New York, Columbia 
University Press, 1977, p. 97-130) ; and F.C. COPLESTON, A History of Philosophy, vol. 8, pt. 1, Garden 
City, NY, Image Books, 1966, p. 260. Copleston writes that "Idealist political theory is unduly conserva-
tive" and leads to "disastrous moral conformism." 
30. See G.D.H. COLE, "Loyalties," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, n.s. XXVI (1925-1926), p. 151-
170, at p. 164 ; and Harold LASKI, Studies in the Problem of Sovereignty, New Haven, Yale University 
Press, 1917, p. 23. 
31. J.H. RANDALL, Jr. "Idealistic Social Philosophy and Bernard Bosanquet," p. 115. 
32. B. RUSSELL, "Philosophy in the Twentieth Century," in Sceptical Essays, p. 39. 
33. See J.H. MUIRHEAD, The Platonic Tradition in Anglo-Saxon Philosophy. Studies in the History of Idealism 
in England, London, Allen and Unwin, 1931 ; and Frank M. TURNER, The Greek Heritage in Victorian 
Britain, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1981. 
34. A.D. LINDSAY, "T.H. Green and the Idealists," p. 151 (cited in F.P. HARRIS, The Neo-Idealist Political 
Theory, p. 2-3). 
35. As summarized by Peter P. NICHOLSON, "A Moral View of Politics : T.H. Green and the British Idealists," 
Political Studies, XXXV (1987), p. 122 ; see Gerald GAUS, The Modern Liberal Theory of Man, Canberra, 
Croom Helm, 1983. While he says that Bosanquet is a liberal, it is interesting that Gaus does not explicitly 
define what he means by "liberal". Instead, he appears to use the six authors of his study to establish a 
"consensus" about what form liberalism might take and what "prescriptions" liberalism would support (see 
ibid., p. 3-9). 
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There is much to be said in favour of this latter reading. Bosanquet was an active 
Liberal36 : he worked in elections on behalf of the Liberal Party37, was pro-Boer 
during the South African War38 and supported Irish home rule39 and the extension of 
the right to vote. After resigning his position at University College, Oxford, in 1881, 
he moved to London, where he was a principal figure in the Charity Organization 
Society and became involved in educating social workers.40 He lobbied for making 
university-level studies accessible to a wide audience, and organized courses of 
popular lectures through the London Ethical Society and the London School of Ethics 
and Social Philosophy.41 Moreover, Bosanquet defends a number of liberal42 princi-
ples in his work — he emphasizes the importance of human liberty, claims that the 
nature and form of government are limited by individual interests, and argues for the 
recognition of the value of the individual. 
Specifically, Bosanquet advances a political philosophy in which the "end" of the 
state is liberty and personal development — "the perfection of human personality" 
(PTS 189). State action is described as the "hindrance of hindrances" (PTS 182ff.), 
and it is to be employed only to protect or ensure individual moral activity.43 Moreo-
ver, for Bosanquet, the only legitimate form of government is "self government"44 
36. See also F.P. HARRIS, The Neo-Idealist Political Theory, p. 37-38 and 110, n. 136. According to his wife, 
Helen, Bosanquet "was always an advanced Liberal with a strong sympathy for Labour aspirations" (Ber-
nard Bosanquet. A Short Account of his Life, London, Macmillan, 1924, p. 97). 
37. See A.M. McBRIAR, An Edwardian Mixed Doubles. The Bosanquets versus the Webbs. A Study in British 
Social Policy, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1987, p. 8. 
38. See J.H. MUIRHEAD, éd., Bernard Bosanquet and his Friends. Letters Illustrating the Sources and 
Development of his Philosophical Opinions, London, Allen and Unwin, 1935. 
39. See ibid., p. 309 and 311 ; and H. BOSANQUET, Bernard Bosanquet. A Short Account of his Life, p. 99-102. 
40. See A. VINCENT, R. PLANT, Philosophy, Politics and Citizenship, chapter 6 ; and Ellen JACOBS, Bernard 
Bosanquet. Social and Political Thought, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation (City University of New York, 
1986), chapter 5. 
41. See A. VINCENT, R. PLANT, Philosophy, Politics and Citizenship, p. 95-126 ; A.M. McBRIAR, An Ed-
wardian Mixed Doubles, p. 6-7 ; and E. JACOBS, Bernard Bosanquet. Social and Political Thought, chap-
ters 6 and 8. 
42. See Joseph RAZ'S definition of "liberalism" as the view that political authorities "are bound by principles 
requiring the promotion and protection of freedom" (see The Morality of Freedom, New York, Oxford 
University Press, 1986, p. 21). For some important recent discussions of the term, see William GALSTON, 
Liberal Purposes. Goods, Virtues, and Diversity in the Liberal State, New York, Cambridge University 
Press, 1991, and Jeremy WALDRON, "Theoretical Foundations of Liberalism," The Philosophical Quar-
terly, 37 (1987), p. 128. 
43. In fact, it is for reasons such as this that Bosanquet was accused by Hobhouse and Hobson of being too 
"individualistic" (see Stefan COLLINI, "Hobhouse, Bosanquet and the State. Philosophical Idealism and 
Political Argument in England : 1880-1918," Past and Present, 72 (1976), p. 87,95 and 109). 
44. Admittedly, the notion of "self government" here is quite different from that employed by earlier liberals, 
such as Bentham or Mill. It seems that, wherever one finds a system of institutions which function in order 
to attain a public and common good, Bosanquet would allow that one has an example of genuine and le-
gitimate self government — even if, paradoxically, that government turns out not to be democratic. Thus, 
for Bosanquet, it is possible to have "self government" where the form of government is neither popularly 
elected nor representative — and even where the state is directed by a single individual. (Here, one might 
think of Hegel's view of a single head of state — a "monarch" — who establishes, promulgates and en-
forces law. See Hegel's Philosophy of Right, [tr. T.M. Knox, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1945], sees. 279ff. 
and 286.) Nevertheless, as I note below, Bosanquet would insist that, in the western world at least, self-
government should be democratic. 
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which, he says, is based on the will of the individual, via the mechanism of the 
"rational" or "real will"45. And, for peoples that have reached a level of civilization 
comparable to his own, he would insist that government have the form of a represen-
tative, parliamentary democracy (e.g., PTS xxx ; LVIII ; 51 ; 66). One also finds in 
Bosanquet a defence of individual rights that have legal weight and that serve as a 
measure to evaluate the moral character of states (PTS 189 ; FS 277).46 Finally, he 
argues that the activity of the state is subject to change as a result of "criticism" from 
within (PTS 111, 140)47 and, in the event that a particular government does not 
respond to such criticism, he says that one may even have a duty to rebel against it 
(FS281 ; see PTS 199). 
Bosanquet also underscores the importance of the individual. Although he takes 
pains to remind his readers of the social dimension of the human person, Bosanquet 
denies that individuals can be reduced to their functions or that they become "one 
with the community" (PTS 51), and says that the individual is unique — though "not 
as an atom, but as a case of a law" (PTS 292). In fact, some of Bosanquet's remarks 
suggest a value for the individual based on the will, à la Kant.48 He says that "[t]he 
will or character which is the atmosphere of values and shares their quality is itself a 
value... [and has] a value of its own"49 and that "we have an undeniable human value 
of a distinct and universal type, in which there cannot be a human creature who is not 
a partaker in some mode or degree."50 
Bosanquet's recognition of the worth of the individual is also reflected in his 
claim that "[t]he aim of politics is to find and realise the individual" (PTS LVi). 
Admittedly, in The Philosophical Theory of the State, he seems to hold that the value 
of a human person is influenced by the extent to which that person fulfils the re-
quirements of his or her position or function in society.51 But this does not mean that 
45. Bosanquet's argument for the identification of the general will and the individual's real will cannot be 
given here. I discuss this controversial notion in "Bernard Bosanquet and the Development of Rousseau's 
Idea of the General Will," Man and Nature - L'Homme et la Nature, X (1991), p. 179-197. See also 
P. NICHOLSON, The Political Philosophy of the British Idealists. Selected Studies, p. 198-230. 
46. For an extended argument on this point, see my "Individual Rights, Communitarianism, and British 
Idealism," in The Bill of Rights. Bicentennial Reflections, Y. Hudson and C. Peden, éd., Lewiston, NY, 
Edwin Mellen Press, 1993, p. 261-277. 
47. As Nicholson notes, "Bosanquet's position, far from being one of 'bedrock conservatism' [this is 
Hobhouse's objection. See L.T. HOBHOUSE, The Metaphysical Theory of the State, p. 24], is one of perma-
nent reform" (Peter P. NICHOLSON, The Political Philosophy of the British Idealists. Selected Studies, 
p. 221). For an opposing view, see Stefan COLLINI, "Hobhouse, Bosanquet and the State. Philosophical 
Idealism and Political Argument in England : 1880-1918," p. 110. 
48. There are other apparent Kantian influences in Bosanquet's work, such as the emphasis on the value of 
motive in moral action and on the development of moral character — the "good will" — as the end of 
moral life. 
49. See Some Suggestions in Ethics, London, Sonnenschein, 1918, p. 132. 
50. Some Suggestions in Ethics, p. 77. 
51. BOSANQUET states that one cannot separate individuals from their roles in society : "man really does not 
exist as man without some station and duties" ("The Kingdom of God on Earth," in Essays and Addresses, 
London, 1889, p. 116, reprinted in Science and Philosophy and Other Essays by the Late Bernard Bosan-
quet, J.H. Muirhead and R.C. Bosanquet, éd., London, 1927). And it would seem that there is little to per-
sons apart from the functions they have and the positions they fill. (See Bosanquet's reference to an indi-
vidual who loses all her "positions" and functions [ibid., p. 118].) 
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the individual is just an instrument necessary to carry out certain social tasks. Bosan-
quet emphasizes that the individual self cannot be used as a means. Again, it is true 
that Bosanquet says it is the "realization of human personality as a whole," and not 
the human individual, that is the basis or principle of value. Nevertheless, by insisting 
that one cannot have an adequate account of the nature and value of individuals, 
separate from the social world in which they exist, it does not follow their value is 
incidental or secondary.52 For Bosanquet, neither the individual nor the state is fun-
damental ; an individual is neither merely a means, nor of instrumental value, to 
anything else ; he writes that "[t]o make the totality the means to the differentiation or 
vice versa is like making a drama the means to the characters, or the characters the 
means to the drama" (PTS 168). 
This third view of later idealist political thought acknowledges that Bosanquet's 
philosophy must be distinguished from the more "atomistic" views of Bentham, Mill 
and Spencer. Harris maintains that the idealists, Bosanquet among them, "were 
reinterpreting an indigenous empirical theory and bringing to a more complete devel-
opment the British concept of individuality"53, which he calls "socialized individual-
ity."54 Moreover, this view claims that, in arguing that the principle of value is to be 
found in the "realization of human personality as a whole" — which, Bosanquet 
would note, is consistent with the value of the individual — the later idealists are 
seeking to avoid the kinds of problems that arise in theories that insist that individuals 
have an absolute value (e.g., how to resolve those cases where the desires — and the 
putative rights — of individuals may conflict)55. Harris concludes that, despite these 
differences, "idealist liberalism [including that of Bosanquet] was a continuation of 
what was essential and lasting in the earlier liberalism."56 
On this third reading, then, there is no inconsistency between Bosanquet's ideal-
ism and nineteenth century liberal political thought. Not only does one find a general 
defence of liberal democratic institutions, such as representative government, but a 
similarity in basic principles and in aim.57 
52. See my "F.H. Bradley and Bernard Bosanquet on the Nature and Value of the Individual," paper read at the 
XlXth World Congress of Philosophy [Moscow, Russia], August 1993, and '"Absolute Idealism' and Fi-
nite Individuality," Indian Philosophical Quarterly, XXIV, 4 (October 1997). 
53. F.P. HARRIS, The Neo-Idealist Political Theory, p. 2. This characteristic is also emphasized by Gerald 
Gaus. 
54. F.P. HARRIS, The Neo-Idealist Political Theory, p. 101. 
55. Stefan COLLINI, "Hobhouse, Bosanquet and the State. Philosophical Idealism and Political Argument in 
England: 1880-1918," p. 110-111. 
56. F.P. HARRIS, The Neo-Idealist Political Theory, p. 5. One example of this might be found in Mill's 
reference to the "Greek ideal of self-development" and the comparable notion of "self-realization" pro-
moted by the idealists. (For Mill's view, see On Liberty, Elizabeth Rapaport, éd., Indianapolis, IN, Hackett 
Publ. Co, 1978, p. 59.) 
57. For further support of these claims, see my "Liberalism, Bosanquet and the Theory of the State," in 
Liberalism, Oppression and Empowerment, Y. Hudson and C. Peden, éd., Lewiston, NY, Edwin Mellen 
Press, 1995, p. 3-34 ; and "Law and Liberty in J.S. Mill and Bernard Bosanquet," in The Social Power of 
Ideas, Y. Hudson and C. Peden, éd., Lewiston, NY, Edwin Mellen Press, 1995, p. 361-385. 
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III 
It may be objected, however, that there are a number of features of Bosanquet's 
social and political philosophy that are incompatible with liberalism. As noted above, 
Bosanquet has been charged with being open to "eugenics" as a means of dealing 
with "hereditary pauperism". And, further, his defense of the Majority report of the 
Royal Commission on the Poor Law (1909)58, and his resistance to state intervention 
in matters of social welfare, have led to the charge that his political thought is funda-
mentally "conservative." It has also been noted that Bosanquet describes society as 
"organic" and that the basis of social life is a "common good," so that individual 
interests and individual conceptions of the good must be ultimately unimportant. But 
this, a critic will note, is inconsistent with liberalism, and it is a view that has had 
notoriously illiberal consequences. 
Such evidence is, nevertheless, not conclusive. To begin with, Bosanquet argued 
that the poor, as a class, are no more susceptible to vice than the rich (PTS 270), and 
he did not think that there was any evidence to suggest that poverty or criminality 
could be linked to heredity — though even if it were, the solution was not obviously 
"extinction," but segregation.59 Although Bosanquet provides no argument against 
forced sterilization of the "congenitally feeble-minded," the proposal of "eugenic 
selection" was widely accepted in England at that time and was considered to be on a 
par with the control of disease. Bosanquet, however, explicitly rejected the view that 
"social improvement can come about only by selection."60 And while the Majority 
report of the Poor Law Commission, with which Bosanquet largely agreed, did 
endorse the idea of "a penal system for the intractable residuum of paupers," this was 
also the opinion of the (predominantly Fabian socialist) authors of the minority 
report.61 
Second, while it is true that Bosanquet questioned whether the state ought to 
guarantee full employment or provide housing for all (PTS 178), he nevertheless 
favoured wage and educational reform (PTS 178). He argues, for example, that 
publicly-financed education is necessary for the moral and intellectual development 
of the young — and points out that this policy has been effective (PTS 63). While 
there are differences between Bosanquet and earlier liberals, such as Mill, it seems 
that what separates them on several issues is not their endorsement of liberal ideals, 
but matters of strategy. There is a remarkable similarity between Mill's three restric-
tions on state action in On Liberty^2 and Bosanquet's enumeration of the three cir-
58. See, for example, "Charity Organisation and the Majority Report," International Journal of Ethics, XX 
(1909-1910), p. 395-408. 
59. See Some Suggestions in Ethics, p. 186. 
60. BRADLEY suggests this in his "Some Remarks on Punishment," in Collected Essays, Oxford, p. 149-164 
(reprinted from International Journal of Ethics, 4 [April 1894]). BOSANQUET discusses Bradley's views in 
his Some Suggestions in Ethics, p. 182. See also BOSANQUET's essay "Selection by Maintenance of a So-
cial Standard," in Social and International Ideals, p. 136-160. 
61. A. VINCENT, R. PLANT, Philosophy, Politics and Citizenship, p. 121. 
62. J.S. MILL, On Liberty, p. 107-109. 
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cumstances under which state intervention in an individual's life is morally allowable 
(PTS 179-180), and Bosanquet sometimes criticizes Mill for proposing measures that 
seem inconsistent with Mill's own emphasis on the development of individual char-
acter. 
Finally, it is not at all evident that a theory which insists on the centrality of a 
common good is incompatible with liberalism.63 Bosanquet argues that the common 
good is each individual's good and, while it may not be what an individual v/ants at 
some particular moment, it does not follow that it conflicts with his or her interests.64 
Moreover, Bosanquet insists, this notion of a common good (which reflects the end of 
all human activity, the perfection of human personality) is the basis for his justifica-
tion of the legitimacy of democratic institutions and for his defence of freedom. If 
one looks at history, the notion of a common good, by itself, no more leads to politi-
cal totalitarianism than a positivistic theory of law does, and Bosanquet would un-
doubtedly deny that ethical pluralism or broad individual "licence" is necessary for 
either democracy or liberalism. And, furthermore, it has been argued by some con-
temporary liberals (such as William Galston and Steven DeLue) that the existence of 
a common good is compatible with liberalism and does not exclude the possibility of 
a sphere where individuals can pursue their private interests.65 
From what has been said, it is obvious that there are a number of key liberal prin-
ciples present in Bosanquet's political thought. His ideal is that of a society where 
"free individuals, freely discussing and investigating, may freely develop their inter-
ests and their capacities."66 And even though his concept of individuality is broader 
than that which one finds in earlier liberals, his commitment to democratic institu-
tions and to the development of the human person is in line with their own. This is 
something which Bosanquet himself seems to recognize. In a letter of January 1907 
to Andrew Seth Pringle-Pattison, he writes that there was a "remarkable thread of 
continuity between the Philos, [ophic] Radicals and the later development of the 
social spirit."67 That Bosanquet would think that there was such a continuity is not, of 
course, surprising, given his view of the progressive nature of society and social 
change. 
63. See, for example, the work of Jacques MARITAIN — especially, "La Personne et le Bien commun," Revue 
thomiste, XLVI, 2 (mai-août 1946), p. 237-278 ; Man and the State, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 
1951 ; and Les Droits de l'homme et la loi naturelle, New York, Éditions de la maison française, 1942. 
64. It is true that pluralism or the freedom to determine one's own good is characteristic of many democratic 
traditions, but it does not seem that absolute liberty here is essential to liberalism ; Mill, one will recall, re-
stricts liberty to individuals and cultures that are "mature" (See On Liberty, p. 9-10). Nor does a claim to 
entirely determine one's good seem justifiable unless the "atomic" individual is an ultimate principle of 
value. 
65. See Steven M. DELUE, Political Obligation in a Liberal State, Albany, SUNY Press, 1989 ; and 
W. GALSTON, Liberal Purposes. 
66. F.P. HARRIS, The Neo-Idealist Political Theory, p. Ill ; cf. p. 103. 
67. J.H. MUIRHEAD, éd., Bernard Bosanquet and his Friends, p. 114. 
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IV 
Nevertheless, Bosanquet does break with the liberal tradition in a number of re-
spects. Specifically, he rejects its analyses of liberty and the law and the description 
of the "individual" that, he would argue, these reflect. 
Consider, to begin with, Bosanquet's discussion of the nature of liberty and the 
role of the state and law. According to the earlier, individualist tradition of liberalism, 
liberty is "the absence of [...] external impediments of motion," and one is free when 
"in those things, which by his strength and wit he is able to do, [he] is not hindered to 
do what he has a will to do."68 Corresponding to this account of liberty, these writers 
viewed law "negatively". By its very nature, law is a restriction of liberty and, as Mill 
says, "[a]ll restraint, qua restraint, is an evil."69 Thus, these authors were concerned to 
ensure a "region of human liberty"70 outside of the control of the law, where indi-
viduals can "pursue their own good in their own way."71 
Bosanquet rejects this account in its entirety. He disagrees not only with a de-
scription of liberty as fundamentally "negative liberty," but with both the justification 
that he believes underlies it (e.g., the intrinsic value of the individual self) and its 
extent. At the very least, then, it is misleading to suggest (as Harris does) that the 
idealists were "inclined to accept Mill's theory of liberty."72 For Bosanquet, "liberty" 
means more than "absence of restraint". It means "becoming the best that we have it 
in us to be" (PTS 119) or what was referred to above as "self-realization."73 This 
"end" is objective ; it is not a matter for each individual to determine. Still, Bosanquet 
also recognizes that "self-realization" is not attainable unless human beings partici-
pate actively in their own development. It is only through uncoerced moral activity 
that "the good" — the development of human personality — is possible. 
Furthermore, Bosanquet insists that "law and order" is "the condition and guar-
antee" of liberty (PTS 119), and argues that there is no liberty where there is an 
absence of law. In fact, he says that, as the "restrictions" imposed by law increase, so 
does freedom (PTS 181-182)74. It is, for example, through the law (and, where neces-
sary, the exercise of force) that the state hinders or punishes those who impede other 
individuals in the exercise of their liberty. Again, certain compulsory enactments 
(such as those requiring and providing for the education of children) are the means to 
"an enlarged liberty"75. Moreover, through the legal institution of punishment, the 
68. Thomas HOBBES, Leviathan, Michael Oakeshott, éd., New York, Collier Books, 1962, ch. 21, p. 159. 
69. J.S. MILL, On Liberty, p. 94. Similarly, according to Bentham, "[t]he evil of [...] restraint [is] [...] the pain 
which it gives a man not to be able to do the act." See his An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and 
Legislation, J.H. Burns and H.L.A. Hart, éd., London, Athlone Press, 1970, p. 163 ; cf. PTS 53. 
70. J.S. MILL, On Liberty, p. 11. 
71. Ibid., p. 12. 
72. F.P. HARRIS, The Neo-Idealist Political Theory, p. 102. 
73. Some Suggestions in Ethics, p. 148. 
74. See "Liberty and Legislation," in The Civilization of Christendom and other studies, London, Sonnen-
schein, 1889, p. 358-383, especially p. 366-367. 
75. "Liberty and Legislation," p. 369 ; see also p. 376. 
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state "brings us to our senses [...] [and] makes us conscious of our errors and the 
moral decision to improve our behaviour" (PTS 208). It is, in other words, by means 
of the state and the law that "we find at once discipline and expansion, the transfigu-
ration of partial impulses, and something to do and to care for, such as the nature of a 
human self demands" (PTS 140). Indeed, following Kant, Bosanquet notes that the 
"free mind" cannot exist "[e]xcept by expressing itself in relation to an ordered 
life."76 But this is not to say that the state may do as it wishes, and Bosanquet insists 
that the law can properly be invoked only once certain conditions have been met 
(PTS 179-180).77 
Bosanquet also breaks with earlier liberalism so far as he rejects the individual-
ism that, he argues, is presupposed in the theories of such liberals as Spencer, Ben-
tham and Mill. 
On this individualist view, there is no "self or "individual" other than the bio-
logical individual, and individuals are the basic units of the social sphere.78 Consis-
tent with this, and "[a]t the core of this mode of political thought was a fundamental 
postulate about the nature of value, viz., that all value inheres ultimately in the satis-
factions and realizations of human personality."79 For example, it is on the basis of 
pleasures and pains, which can exist only in individuals, that Mill was able to con-
struct a calculus of value.80 Moreover, according to this account, an individual is "the 
final judge" of his or her "own concerns."81 In short, much of the liberalism of Bo-
sanquet's predecessors is marked by an ontological and a moral individualism, where 
"the individual human being is conceived as the source of values and as himself the 
supreme value."82 
76. PTS 236. Bosanquet cites Kant that, in living in civil society, man "has totally abandoned his wild lawless 
freedom in order to find his entire freedom again undiminished in a lawful dependence, that is, in a condi-
tion of right or law ; [undiminished], because this dependence springs from his own legislative will" (PTS 
226). See Immanuel KANT, Metaphysische Anfangsgrunde der Rechtslehre (1797) Benzion Kellermann, 
éd., (Die Metaphysik der Sitten, 2. Teil, 1. Abschnitt), in Kant's Werke, Bd. 7, Ernst Cassirer, éd., Berlin, 
1916, S 47, p. 122. 
77. These criteria are : first, an important development in individual character must be being frustrated in some 
way ; second, the benefits of such a development must be greater than the disadvantages involved in the 
restrictions to be imposed on the person ; and, finally, it must be better that the action to be commanded by 
the law be done from any motive whatsoever than that it not take place (PTS 179-180). When the law is 
used to hinder the liberty — that is, the self-realization — of an individual, it is incompatible with itself. 
78. As Mill remarks, "[h]uman beings in society have no properties but those which are derived from, and 
which may be resolved into, the laws of the nature of individual men" (System of Logic, Bk. VI, ch. 7, 
sec. 1, in Collected Works, vol. VIII, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1969-1986, p. 879). One finds 
the same view in Bentham, where he remarks that "the community is a fictitious body" ; it is but "a sum of 
the interests of the several members who compose it" (An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and 
Legislation, ch. 1, 3.4, p. 12). 
79. George SABINE, A History of Political Theory, 4th éd., Hinsdale, IL, The Dryden Press, 1973, p. 608. 
80. Ibid., p. 640. 
81. J.S. MILL, On Liberty, p. 74. 
82. See Graeme Duncan and John Gray, "The Left Against Mill," in New Essays on John Stuart Mill and 
Utilitarianism, éd., Wesley E. Cooper, Kai Nielsen and Steven C. Patten, Guelph : Canadian Association 
for Publishing in Philosophy, 1979 (Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Supplementary Volume V), p. 203-
230, p. 215. 
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Again, Bosanquet notes, for there to be the "region of liberty" insisted upon by 
his predecessors — a precinct in which individuals are free and autonomous — there 
must be some principle of "demarcation" that allows one to separate "the individual" 
from "others," and to distinguish the sphere of individual liberty from the sphere of 
social obligation. He argues, however, that any such boundary is simply "arbitrary," 
for "every act of mine affects both myself and others ; it is a matter of mood and 
momentary urgency which aspect may be pronounced characteristic and essential" 
(PTS 60). More importantly, he believes that such a principle exhibits too narrow an 
understanding of the nature of persons. It implies a view of the individual as "a sort 
of inner self (PTS 178), independent of "the varied play of relations and obligations 
in society" (PTS 74), and ignores the centrality of the social dimension of human 
personality. Furthermore, the demands of such a "principle of demarcation" seem to 
conflict with important liberal ideals. Sometimes "the maintenance of external condi-
tions of good life" (PTS 64) lies within the power of the law but, because this could 
violate the putative boundary between "self and "other," the individualist view 
would forbid it.83 On the other hand, Bosanquet believes that it would certainly be 
wrong to suggest that, simply because our moral obligations touch on the legitimate 
interests of others, they can or ought to be enforced by law (PTS 63 ; xxxv). But 
some individualist views seem to allow just this. In short, Bosanquet argues that the 
concept of "self employed in these authors is inadequate and inconsistent with 
several of the aims of liberalism — including the development of the individual. 
Finally, Bosanquet objected to the liberalism of his predecessors because he saw 
it as implying a theory of political obligation and of self-government that he consid-
ered deficient. Like Bentham and Mill, he embraced democratic and representative 
government, but noted that laws based simply on the majority decision still involve 
the coercion of "others" over "the one" (see PTS 71-72). Because its accounts of law, 
liberty and the individual lead to problems in understanding the nature of human 
autonomy, and because it ignores the possibility of a "real" or "general" will having 
authority over an individual's "actual will," Bosanquet believes that, in the end, 
authors such as Spencer, Bentham and Mill can turn only to force as the basis of the 
state.84 
83. As an example of this, see Bosanquet's criticism of Mill concerning publicly-financed education, noted 
above. Mill's objection to this policy, one will recall, is not merely that this "establishes a despotism over 
the mind" by public authorities (On Liberty, p. 105) and leads to conformity, but also that it works against 
"the importance of individuality of character" (ibid., p. 104). Bosanquet's response to this is that Mill's 
fear of public intervention is unwarranted, and that his alternative proposal for "universal State-enacted ex-
amination" (PTS 63 ; see L 103-107) is more likely to produce bland conformism and a hierarchical soci-
ety, inattentive to individual differences. It might appear that there is little fundamental disagreement be-
tween Mill and Bosanquet on this point — that it is just an empirical question of which policy will best 
lead to the development of individual character. But what is really at stake here is something more far-
reaching — that is, each's view of the role of the state. Bosanquet is concerned with what the state can do 
to positively contribute to moral and intellectual development. Mill's view seems to be that such a view of 
state action goes too far ; the state can intervene only when a parent harms or risks harming (e.g., through 
negligence in assuring the education of) his or her children. Bosanquet would surely say, however, the is-
sue should not be whether someone might be harmed, but whether the state can help. 
84. Again, for a more complete argument here, see my "Law and Liberty in J.S. Mill and Bernard Bosanquet," 
supra, n. 57. 
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In rejecting these elements of earlier liberalism, Bosanquet believed that he was 
still faithful to many of its principles and goals. In fact, he maintained that these goals 
required a recognition of the social nature of the individual and a defense of a 
"positive" understanding of liberty and the law. A.D. Lindsay acknowledges this 
when he says that the idealists "were convinced [...] that no further progress could be 
made in an understanding of politics till a new philosophic basis was found for 
liberalism."85 This meant abandoning a focus on duties and rights — on "claims and 
counter claims"86 — and turning, instead, to an ideal of "service and counter-
service."87 Thus, Bosanquet described himself as a "moral socialist" (i.e., one who 
held that "the good of the social whole was to be identified with the moral essence of 
the individual"88), and said that, if this doctrine were made the basis of an "economic 
socialism," it would be "heaven."89 He was also in favour of worker ownership90 and, 
Muirhead says, "was prepared [...] for any amount of collectivism."91 Not surpris-
ingly, later in life, Bosanquet found his sympathies at times rather close to the Labour 
Party.92 
V 
It is clear, then, that Bosanquet is not an individualist, that he sees no fundamen-
tal antagonism between liberty and law, that he emphasizes the importance of a 
common good, instead of the pursuit of merely private or personal goods, and that he 
maintains that state action and the law play essential roles in the development of the 
individual. Bosanquet is certainly not a "classical" liberal. 
85. A.D. LINDSAY, "T.H. Green and the Idealists," p. 151. 
86. See The Value and Destiny of the Individual, London, Macmillan, 1913, lecture V, especially p. 132-133. 
87. W.D. LAMONT, The Principles of Moral Judgement, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1946, p. 166. Bosanquet 
largely adopts the view of ethics, described by F.H. Bradley in Lecture V of Ethical Studies, that focuses 
on the fulfilment of the duties of one's station or position. See "The Kingdom of God on Earth," p. 116ff. 
See also my discussion of this in "F.H. Bradley and Bernard Bosanquet," in Philosophy after F.H. Bradley, 
James Bradley, éd., Bristol, Thoemmes Press, 1996, p. 31-56. 
88. A.M. MCBRIAR, An Edwardian Mixed Doubles, p. 112. 
89. See "The Antithesis between Individualism and Socialism Philosophically Considered," in BOSANQUET, 
The Civilization of Christendom and Other Studies, London, Sonnenschein, 1893, p. 304-357 ; and 
A.M. MCBRIAR, An Edwardian Mixed Doubles, p. 113. Bosanquet distinguished "moral socialism" from 
"economic socialism" which he saw as "deeply individualistic [...] i.e., akin to a mechanical arrangement 
for satisfying individual desires, although it may amalgamate with other ideas." (See his review of The 
English Poor, by Thomas MacKay, in Charity Organisation Review, V (December 1889), p. 460-466, at 
p. 463, cited in E. JACOBS, Bernard Bosanquet. Social and Political Thought, p. 122-123.) 
90. See BOSANQUET's lecture "Ownership and Management," in Social and International Ideals, p. 211-229. 
See also A. VINCENT, R. PLANT, Philosophy, Politics and Citizenship, p. 121. 
91. See J.H. MUIRHEAD, éd., Bernard Bosanquet and his Friends, p. 48. 
92. Note Bosanquet's comment to R.F.A. Hoernlé in 1919 that "I should like a labour government with one or 
two good liberals in it" (cited in J.H. MUIRHEAD, éd., Bernard Bosanquet and his Friends, p. 218-219). 
Adam Ulam allows that Bosanquet's "theory as a whole" is not inconsistent with socialism (The Philo-
sophical Foundations of English Socialism, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1951, p. 60), and 
W.D. Lamont suggests that "[t]he theory of communism [...] is based on [...] the [same] ideal of service 
and counter-service" (W.D. LAMONT, The Principles of Moral Judgement, p. 167). 
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Still, given his view of the nature and limits of the state, and of the importance of 
the individual, it is also inappropriate and unjust to describe Bosanquet's thought as 
"illiberal." While it may be true that, on such issues as the role and limits of the state, 
Bosanquet and earlier liberals (such as Bentham and Mill) disagree, the practical 
differences between them are minimal. He shares many of the aims and concerns of 
"liberals" before him, he champions a number of liberal institutions and, as there is 
no necessary connexion between liberalism and individualism,93 there seems no 
sufficient reason to hold that he stands outside the current of nineteenth century 
British liberalism. While the arrival of "German" thought in England may have 
provided idealists, like Bosanquet, with new approaches and arguments, there is not 
enough evidence to establish that there was "a complete break"94 or "a complete 
recoil" from the tradition of Anglo-Saxon philosophy.95 Commentators such as 
Dockhorn and Metz — as well as Hobson, Hobhouse and Morrow — obviously go 
too far in their insistence that Bosanquet's work is incompatible with British liberal 
political thought. In fact, Bosanquet may well be seen as pointing to a "liberalism" 
that puts the lie to some of the notions often associated with it. 
It is true that Bosanquet embraced an "organic" conception of society with a 
common good and held that there were "collective interests" which were more im-
portant than the particular desires of "finite individuals." But there is no evidence to 
support the claim that Bosanquet's theory defended the absolute power of the nation 
state. Moreover, his claim that one cannot adequately understand the nature of indi-
viduals apart from their "station" and duties within the state neither entails nor pro-
poses that individuals "lose themselves" in it. 
Nevertheless, despite the continuity in history and in aim, given the influence on 
his political theory by his own non-individualist metaphysic96, Bosanquet does not 
93. For a recent recognition of this, see S.M. DELUE (e.g., Political Obligation in a Liberal State, p. X-XI). 
DeLue speaks of two competing kinds of liberalism : individualist and "communalist." 
94. F.P. HARRIS, The Neo-Idealist Political Theory, p. 59. 
95. Metz argues that British idealism "was neither directly nor indirectly connected with" the "idealistic 
systems and motives" of earlier centuries, and that "it could not have sprung directly from a native tradi-
tion" (R. METZ, Die philosophischen Strômungen der Gegenwart in Grofibritannien, p. 238). But for all its 
admitted indebtedness to Kant and Hegel, it does not follow that there is a break with the older tradition. 
Such allegedly "Germanic" influences as the organicist view of the state and the analysis of the individual 
as a social and political being owe at least as much to Plato and Aristotle as to Hegel and Kant, and Metz 
touches only lightly on the fact that the need for, and the development of, Kantian and Hegelian ideas were 
quite clearly a product of the distinctive situation in philosophy in mid-nineteenth century Britain. Metz 
does not, moreover, address the argument of J.H. Muirhead, that the "German" influences on idealism have 
been exaggerated and that many have failed to recognize the lengthy tradition of "Platonic" philosophy in 
England (see J.H. MUIRHEAD, The Platonic Tradition in Anglo-Saxon Philosophy, p. 14-15). 
96. Hence, I would reject the view that British idealist social philosophy can be separated entirely from its 
metaphysics — though the question then becomes how far the relation between the two extends. According 
to Bertil Pfannenstill, the relation is essential. He writes that "[i]f, as Bosanquet does, a philosopher calls 
his political theory philosophical, metaphysical, or speculative, the natural result will be that the political 
theory, severed from its theoretical philosophical relations, will appear to be, so to say, floating in the air" 
{Bernard Bosanquet's Philosophy of the State, Lund, 1936, p. 116). A.J.M. Milne, however, argues that the 
political philosophy can, at least, be separated from a theory of the Absolute (see The Social Philosophy of 
English Idealism, London, 1962, p. 196). Stefan Collini simply notes that there is "sufficient overlap in 
[the idealists's] social theories and their metaphysical foundations to justify considering the structure of 
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merely repeat the liberalism of the nineteenth century, but provides a genuine ad-
vance on it. On his view, many of the underpinnings of the earlier liberalism need to 
be not just modified, but rethought.97 Yet, for all this, in light of his account of the 
individual, liberty and the state, one must recognize Bosanquet's place in the liberal 
tradition of British political thought. 
their philosophy, and the nature of its conceptual legacy, as a whole" ("Sociology and Idealism in Britain : 
1880-1920," Archives européennes de sociologie, 19 (1978), p. 3-50, at p. 10-11). 
97. Thus, according to Ernest Barker, "[n]ot a modification of the old Benthamite premises, but a new 
philosophy was needed ; and that philosophy was provided by the idealist school" (See Ernest BARKER, 
Political Thought in England : 1848-1914, London, 1915, p. 10-11). 
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